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TESTING POOR PREGNANT WOMEN 
FOR COCAINE — PHYSICIANS
AS POLICE INVESTIGATORS
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.
N 1989, Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall surmised that “declaring a war on illegal
drugs is good public policy . . . [but] the first,
and worst, casualty of war will be the precious liber-
ties of our citizens.”1 The same year, in the midst of
President George Bush’s “war on drugs,” the Medi-
cal University of South Carolina initiated a program
to screen selected pregnant patients for cocaine and
to provide positive test results to the police.2 At a time
of high public concern about “cocaine babies,” this
program seemed reasonable to the university and lo-
cal public officials. Drug-screening programs in other
groups of people had been found constitutional by
the Supreme Court,1,3 and it was beginning to appear
that the war on drugs would claim the Fourth Amend-
ment, which prohibits unreasonable searches, as one
of its first casualties.4
In this context, it seemed as if the university’s pol-
icy might survive a constitutional challenge — and
it did in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
in 1999 rejected a challenge to the policy.5 In March
2001, however, the Supreme Court found that the
policy was constitutionally deficient.6
THE POLICY OF THE MEDICAL 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
The university policy, developed with the local
police department, ultimately provided that a preg-
nant woman who tested positive for cocaine would
be given a letter from the prosecutor saying that if she
successfully completed a drug-treatment program she
would not be prosecuted. If she did not complete
the program, however, the police would be notified
and she would be arrested and charged with drug
distribution and child neglect. If she tested positive
at the time of delivery, she would be arrested imme-
diately and charged with child neglect.2 Pregnant
women were to be tested for cocaine if they met any
of nine criteria: the receipt of no prenatal care, of late
prenatal care after 24 weeks’ gestation, or of incom-
plete prenatal care; abruptio placentae; intrauterine
fetal death; preterm labor “of no obvious cause”; in-
trauterine growth retardation “of no obvious cause”;
previously known drug or alcohol abuse; and unex-
I
plained congenital anomalies.6 The hospital’s general
counsel was not entirely supportive of the program
and wrote to the state’s attorney general that he would
“prefer to have the mothers sign an informed con-
sent to the drug screen [and that] the DSS [Depart-
ment of Social Services] be notified rather than law
enforcement. . . . The other weakness in this pro-
gram is that the main prosecutions have been against
black indigent mothers.”2
Under the policy, which was in effect until 1994,
253 women tested positive for cocaine. Thirty of them
were arrested, and two were sentenced to prison. Ten
of the women who were arrested sued for violation
of their constitutional rights. They were represented
by the American Civil Liberties Union. Nine of the
10 were black. All were poor. Six had been arrested
at the hospital, shortly after giving birth. Three had
been arrested when they failed to complete a drug-
treatment program. The only white woman of the 10
was told at a prenatal visit that she must either vol-
untarily admit herself to a psychiatric unit or be ar-
rested. She spent 30 days in the unit before giving
birth. The lawsuit was filed in 1993.
The university discontinued its policy in Septem-
ber 1994 in a settlement agreement with the Civil
Rights Division of the Department of Health and
Human Services, which was investigating whether
the policy violated the Civil Rights Act. In that same
month, the Office for Protection from Research
Risks of the National Institutes of Health, after in-
vestigating a complaint, notified the university that
its cocaine-testing policy constituted a research project
that had not been reviewed by the institutional re-
view board, a violation of federal regulations.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Because the 10 women were suing for monetary
damages, and because the university would not agree
to discontinue using noncriminal coercive measures,
including civil commitment, their lawsuit against the
university, the city, and the police continued even
though the arrest policy had been abandoned. The
Fourth Amendment provides that “the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable search and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.”
The amendment prohibits unreasonable searches by
the police or those working for the police without a
warrant or the consent of the person searched, unless
there is some “special non–law-enforcement need”
for the search that makes it reasonable. At the trial,
the defendants offered two defenses for testing the
urine of the pregnant women for cocaine: first, the
women had in fact consented to the searches, so no
warrant was necessary; and second, even without con-
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sent, the searches were justified by a “special non–
law-enforcement need.” The trial court rejected the
second defense but put the first one to the jury, in-
structing the jury that it had to find in favor of the
women unless it found they had consented to the
search. The jury found in favor of the defendants.
The women appealed.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
finding in a two-to-one opinion, but for a different
reason.5 The circuit court held that the searches
were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as a
matter of law because of the “special need” to protect
women and children from the complications of the
maternal use of cocaine.5 The dissenting judge dis-
agreed and also concluded that the evidence of con-
sent was insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict.5 The
women appealed again.
THE MAJORITY DECISION 
OF THE SUPREME COURT
In a six-to-three opinion, the Supreme Court re-
versed the decision of the circuit court regarding the
special-needs exception and sent the case back to the
circuit court for a factual determination of whether
the women had actually consented to the search. Jus-
tice John Paul Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court,
focusing on the special-needs exception. That excep-
tion had been adopted in 1989 by the Supreme Court
in two cases. One involved testing railway workers for
drugs and alcohol after major train accidents. The
other involved testing U.S. Customs employees for
drug use when they were seeking sensitive jobs or
promotions.1,3 The special-needs exception had also
been used to justify the drug testing of high-school
students participating in interscholastic sports.7 It
had, however, been found insufficient to make drug
testing a condition for filing candidate papers for
certain state offices.8
Justice Stevens concluded that in each of these cases
the Court had used a “balancing test that weighed the
intrusion on the individual’s interest in privacy against
the ‘special needs’ that supported the program.” The
purpose of testing railway workers, for example, was
to try to learn the cause of accidents so as to prevent
them; the Customs employees were tested to make
sure they could not easily be compromised by drug
smugglers; high-school athletes were tested to see
whether they were eligible for an extracurricular activ-
ity. Stevens observed that the non–law-enforcement
purpose of the drug tests in all these special-needs cas-
es was clear and that precautions were taken to ensure
that the police did not obtain the results.
Justice Stevens found that the “critical difference”
between the previous special-needs cases and this one
was the “nature of the ‘special need’ asserted for the
warrantless search.” Specifically, Stevens concluded
that whereas the special need in each of the previous
cases was “divorced from the State’s general interest
in law enforcement,” in South Carolina “the central
and indispensable feature of the [drug-testing] policy
from its inception was the use of law enforcement to
coerce the patients into substance abuse treatment.”
The drug-testing policy of the Medical University
of South Carolina, Stevens concluded, was “ultimate-
ly indistinguishable from the [state’s] general interest
in crime control.” This conclusion followed from the
fact that the police helped to develop the program,
were involved in its day-to-day administration, deter-
mined the procedures to be followed, and coordinat-
ed the “timing and circumstances of the arrests with
[university] staff,” and that women were jailed. In Jus-
tice Stevens’s words, “The threat of law enforcement
may ultimately have been intended as the means to an
end, but the direct and primary purpose of [the uni-
versity’s] policy was to ensure the use of those means.
In our opinion, this distinction is critical.”
The Court sent the question of whether the wom-
en had consented back to the circuit court for fur-
ther consideration. According to the original instruc-
tions to the jury, in order to find that the women
had provided informed consent, the jury had to con-
clude not only that the women consented to have a
urine sample taken for medical testing but also that
they consented to have their urine tested for cocaine
knowing that the results of the testing would be
turned over to the police. Even though the jury did
find that consent had been provided, the dissenting
judge in the Fourth Circuit Court decision may have
correctly concluded that there was insufficient evi-
dence for them to come to this conclusion. The con-
sent form that was used, for example, was general and
vague, providing simply that “attending physicians,
members of the House Staff, and the Medical Uni-
versity Clinics have my permission to reveal informa-
tion to appropriate agencies and individuals where it
becomes necessary to protect the welfare of myself/
the patient and/or the community.” Far from being
evidence that informed consent to share incriminat-
ing evidence of drug use with the police was ob-
tained, the form is evidence that it was not. Nothing
in the form indicated to the patient that her consent
could lead to arrest and imprisonment. 
Since the university’s policy was discontinued in
1994, and since no other hospital or state in the coun-
try has adopted such a policy, the Court’s decision has
no immediate effect on medical practice. It will, how-
ever, discourage others from adopting a similar policy.
THE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING 
OPINIONS
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a concurring opin-
ion that no other justice joined. Kennedy’s point
seems to be that cocaine use during pregnancy is ter-
rible and that the state has the authority to oppose and
punish it, although he agrees that the Fourth Amend-
ment limits what the state can do. In his words, the
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state has a legitimate interest in fetal life and is legit-
imately concerned with “the grave risk to the life
and health of the fetus, and later the child, caused
by cocaine ingestion. . . . South Carolina can im-
pose punishment upon an expectant mother who
has so little regard for her own unborn that she risks
causing him or her lifelong damage and suffering.”
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion
for himself, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, and Jus-
tice Clarence Thomas. His opinion is perhaps most
notable for its peculiar view of physicians and the doc-
tor–patient relationship. Scalia believes that as long as
the pregnant women consented to having their urine
taken, it is irrelevant whether or not they knew what
it would be tested for or who would obtain the test
results. In this regard, he compared the relationship
between a doctor and a patient to that between a sus-
pected criminal and a police informant who has
gained the confidence of a suspect. Information vol-
untarily disclosed by the suspect to the police inform-
ant can be used against the suspect. Scalia thinks the
same principle should apply to patients. In his words,
“information obtained through violation of a relation-
ship of trust is obtained consensually, and is hence not
a search.”
Even if this conclusion were to be rejected, Scalia
argued, the special-needs exception should still apply:
there is no difference, argued Scalia, between the ac-
tions of the physicians in this case and their actions
in adherence to specific statutes that require them to
report certain findings, such as gunshot wounds, to
the police. Scalia compared physicians to probation
officers, seeing no difference between a probation of-
ficer’s search of a parolee’s home for a gun and the
physician’s search of a patient’s body for cocaine. He
concluded with his view that the primary purpose of
the policy at the Medical University of South Caro-
lina was not law enforcement but the provision of
health benefits to the women through the identifi-
cation of a “drug-impaired mother and child for
necessary medical treatment.”
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
AND PHYSICIANS
For more than a decade, it has seemed that the war
on drugs in the United States would gut the Fourth
Amendment.9 The trend toward approving searches of
urine for the presence of drugs, however, has now
been stalled, if not stopped. The reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the doctor–patient relationship ren-
ders unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment non-
consensual searches for the presence of illegal drugs as
part of a plan to turn this information over to the po-
lice. As the majority of the Court stressed, it is one
thing to require physicians to report certain findings
from the ordinary course of administering treatment,
such as evidence of child abuse or neglect or even
gunshot wounds. It is another thing for physicians to
work directly with the police to search for evidence of
criminal behavior. In the first instance, the physician
only practices medicine and only performs tests and
procedures that are medically indicated for the care of
the patient. In the second instance, the physician be-
comes an agent of the police, conducting a criminal
investigation that is outside the domain of medicine
and certainly not expected by patients.
There is, nonetheless, some tension inherent in
mandatory reporting laws that the Court does not
acknowledge. These deserve attention. Reporting stat-
utes that are aimed at preventing harm to children
— such as the reporting of child abuse and neglect
to state agencies charged with protecting children —
can be seen as consistent with the physician’s obliga-
tion to the child. No parent has (or should have) the
reasonable expectation that the physician will keep
evidence of child abuse or neglect from the state’s
child-protection services, because both the physician
and the state have obligations to act in the best in-
terests of children by protecting them from serious
harm. Moreover, the child-protection-services agen-
cy is not a police or law-enforcement agency; its only
function is to protect the welfare of children by pro-
viding protective services to them.
Mandatory reporting of gunshot wounds and knife
wounds, however, is more difficult to reconcile with
the duties of physicians, which should be to care for
the wounded person (who can report the source of
the wound to the authorities himself or herself ) rath-
er than try to identify the assailant. Such reporting
can, however, be seen as protective of the patient in-
sofar as it triggers a police hunt for the assailant, and
this goal is consistent with the patient’s interests.
Moreover, the patient is not being accused of a crime.
Nonetheless, as the Court recognizes, the more physi-
cians and nurses become entangled in law enforce-
ment, the more they resemble agents of the police
(and police informants and probation officers) rather
than health care professionals. Physicians’ role in law
enforcement, in turn, undermines the trust patients
place in them and thus the very ability of physicians to
practice medicine; distrustful patients will not be can-
did with physicians and may even avoid them altogeth-
er.10,11 During pregnancy, the avoidance of prenatal
care can be as devastating to the fetus as drug abuse.
Medical research fails to support the contention
that the exposure of a fetus to cocaine is uniquely
harmful.12 Rather, the evidence supports the hypoth-
esis that cocaine exposure is itself correlated with oth-
er harmful factors, including poverty, malnutrition,
and exposure to tobacco, marijuana, and alcohol.12,13
Thus, there is no medical justification for special in-
tervention related only to fetal exposure to cocaine.
FETUSES AND THE COURT
The South Carolina case is about the Fourth
Amendment and its prohibition of unreasonable
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searches, but it also tells us something about the views
of the individual justices with regard to the power of
the states to protect the fetus from its mother. The
justices line up almost exactly as they did on the 2000
partial-birth–abortion case. Those who believed the
state has the authority to prohibit so-called partial-
birth abortions also approved of physicians’ working
closely with the police to screen the urine of impov-
erished pregnant women for cocaine. As in the par-
tial-birth–abortion case, the dissenters found both
medical practice and medical ethics irrelevant to their
conclusions.14,15
As in the abortion case, Justice Kennedy wrote a
separate opinion, although in the drug-testing case he
joined the majority instead of the minority. In both
cases, however, he saw the state’s interest in protect-
ing fetal life and health as stronger than the preg-
nant woman’s interest in her own life and health. In
both cases he also approved of state laws designed to
force pregnant women to act in ways that the state
believed were best for the life or health of the fetus.
In the drug-testing case, Kennedy supports state laws
that criminalize behavior during pregnancy that he
believes harms the fetus and thus the child and that
treat pregnant women more severely than others who
commit the same crime. He sees punishing the moth-
er after the birth of the child as appropriate, although
it is difficult to see how putting a new mother in jail
helps her newborn baby or her other children.
In coming to his conclusion, Kennedy ignores the
reasoning behind the previous decision of the Court
in the 1991 case of Johnson Controls.16 In that case,
the question was whether a private employer could,
consistent with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
exclude women who could become pregnant from
working in jobs that exposed them to lead because
such exposure could harm fetuses. The Court found
that being infertile is not “a bona fide occupational
qualification” for making batteries. Put another way,
employers cannot convert a general desire to protect
the health of fetuses into a job qualification, because
this would effectively exclude almost all women from
the job. In the Court’s words, “women as capable of
doing their job as their male counterparts may not
be forced to choose between having a child and hav-
ing a job.”16 Although Kennedy agreed with the
holding in that case, he joined a concurring opinion
of Justice Byron White that argued that under other
circumstances it might be reasonable for an employ-
er to consider the fetus a “third party” whose safety
was, like that of its customers, its responsibility.
In Johnson Controls, the Court noted that Con-
gress had left the welfare of the next generation to
parents, not employers, and wrote that “Decisions
about the welfare of future children must be left to
the parents who conceive, bear, support, and raise
them rather than to the employers who hire those
parents.”16 The same reasoning applies to drug abuse.
Drug abuse is an important problem, as is exposure
to lead. But to penalize pregnant women more than
other women and men for the same act makes preg-
nancy itself the relevant variable. Doing so deprives
women of their rights for no other reason than that
they are pregnant. Johnson Controls was about inter-
preting a statute, whereas the South Carolina case
involves an interpretation of the Constitution. None-
theless, the rationale of fetal protection claimed by the
supporters of the policies in both cases is the same.
And in both cases, the Court concluded that the rights
of women (whether statutory or constitutional) are
not automatically forfeited because of pregnancy. 
Fetal protection cannot reasonably be used to jus-
tify uniquely restricting or criminalizing the activi-
ties of pregnant women.17 This would start us down
the slippery slope of controlling all behaviors of preg-
nant women, criminal or not, that might affect the
health of their fetus — not only alcohol use and smok-
ing, but also working at certain jobs and engaging
in certain sports.18,19
Remarkably, Justice Marshall’s prediction that the
war on drugs would spell the demise of the Fourth
Amendment now appears far less likely to come true.
A Court that strongly supports both law enforcement
and the war on drugs has finally declared unequivo-
cally that there are limits on the tactics that can be
used in that war, and some of these limits are set by
the Fourth Amendment.
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